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claims were not barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
This court agreed with the decision of the lower court, but not with its
rationale. The court stated that the Spill Fund was a revolving fund used to
finance both the prevention and the cleanup of hazardous discharges and to
compensate those damaged by these discharges. The Spill Fund set the
statute of limitations for one year from the discovery of damages.
However, at the time of Lacey's claims, no regulations clarified how
discovery of damage applied to a public-entity claimant whose claims
resulted from contamination to a residential water supply.
The court looked at the issue of when a public entity would know or
have reason to know that a Spill Fund claim would need to be made. A
new regulation had since been adopted that clarified this situation.
However, because no clear regulations existed at the time of Lacey's
claims and this caused uncertainty, the court held that it would be unfair
not to let Lacey proceed. The court also looked at the compatibility of the
interests among the parties involved and found that each parties' interests
would be advanced by allowing Lacey to file these claims.
Melinda B. Barton
In re Tideland's License, 740 A.2d 1125 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999) (holding that the inland owners had sufficient indicia of riparian
ownership to justify approval of the tideland's license by the New Jersey
Tidelands Resource Council).
A landowner appealed the issuance of a seven-year revocable tidelands
license permitting the "use and maintenance of a pier in Clay Pit Creek,
out shore of a twenty-foot wide riparian right-of-way" located between two
adjacent riparian properties. The appellant owned one of the properties.
Between the two lots existed a strip of land running from the street to the
creek. It seemed fairly evident that the subdivision developers planned and
approved this strip of riparian property to provide the inland lot owners
access to and use of the creek. Recently, a storm destroyed a dock
constructed offshore of the twenty-foot strip of riparian land, which the
inland owners maintained and used over the years. This offshore use
impinged upon the State's ownership interests in the adjacent tidelands, so
when the inland lot owners sought to rebuild the dock in the late 1990's, a
statute required them to obtain a waterfront development permit and a
tideland license from the New Jersey Tidelands Resource Council
("Council"). The landowner then appealed the Council's grant of the
license.
The landowner first contended that the issuance to the inland lot
owners was beyond the authority of the Council and contrary to N.J.S.A.
12:3-10, because the inland lot owners were not "riparian owners" within
the meaning of the statute. The statute authorized the Council to make
grants, leases, or licenses to: "any riparian owner on tidewaters in this
State who is desirous to obtain a lease, grant or conveyance from the State
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of New Jersey of any lands under water in front of his lands . . . . " The
State was the proprietor of all lands under tidelands and possesses all of the
incidents of ownership, including the absolute discretion in making
conveyances or granting licenses to its tidelands, subject to the governing
statutory criteria and the demands of the public trust doctrine. The Council
held the authority to exercise this discretion with the approval of the
Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection.
Its
determinations were entitled to a presumption of validity.
The court found that the Council reviewed the factual evidence and
properly concluded that the inland lot owners were riparian owners within
the meaning of the statute. It accepted the position that the deeded rights to
the twenty-foot strip of riparian property gave the inland lot owners
sufficient indicia of riparian ownership, giving them the ability to apply for
a riparian lease. It further concluded that appellant's stated reasons for the
purpose of the right-of-way, for an underground drainage system, were
without any evidence.
The appellant also contended that the language in the deeds conveyed
an easement. An easement holds a right in land different from a fee or
leasehold interest, because it is a "use" interest and not a "possessory" one
in the land. However, the court looked to the intent of the parties as the
determinative element of what a deed conveys, not the labels used. The
court held that the Council properly concluded that the inland lot owners
had sufficient indicia of riparian ownership such as to justify the exercise
of its discretionary authority to issue the revocable license, and does not
reach the title considerations. The court, therefore, affirmed the Council's
grant of the tideland's license.
Melody Divine

NEW YORK
People v. Duell, 698 N.Y.S.2d 87 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (denying
defendant's request for bill of particulars, and claim of ineffective
counsel).
The Duells owned and operated an apartment building located in the
Town of Minerva, Essex County.
A tributary flowed through an
underground culvert on the Duells' property and connected with the
Minerva Stream, a stream environmentally protected for public recreation.
Over a five-year period, the Department of Environmental Conservation
discovered that Duells' sewage system discharged raw sewage onto the
surface of the Duells' property, close to the stream. The Duells were
convicted for failure to repair the sewage system or to acquire the proper
permit for discharging sewage into a state waterway. The Duells appealed
on two points, both of which the court found without merit.
First, the Duells alleged inadequacies in the People's response to their
demand for a bill of particulars.
The court held this contention

